Police and Justice Bill - Standing Committee D

[Derek Conway in the Chair]

Police and Justice Bill

Derek Conway: Before we start the formal proceedings, let me wish everyone good morning. I am sorry that things are a little cramped, but as colleagues will know, Westminster Hall debates are currently being held in Room 10, which means that we must meet in these rather grand circumstances.
I remind the Committee that there is a money resolution in connection with the Bill. Copies are available on the table in front of us, as well as behind us, for those who find that more convenient. I also remind Members that adequate notice should be given of amendments. As a general rule, my co-Chairman, Greg Pope, and I do not intend to call starred amendments.

Michael Fabricant: On a point of order, Mr. Conway. Before we begin the main debate, may I ask whether gentlemen are allowed to remove their jackets, or do you take the traditional view that we must sit here perspiring?

Derek Conway: I sometimes have ambitions to be Sir Nicholas Winterton, but I try to curb them. Therefore, hon. Members may indeed remove their jackets.

Hazel Blears: I beg to move,
That—
(1) during proceedings on the Police and Justice Bill, the Standing Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.00 a.m. on Thursday 16th March) meet—
(a)at 1.00 p.m. on Thursday 16th March;
(b)at 10.30 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 21st March;
(c)at 9.00 a.m. and 1.00 p.m. on Thursday 23rd March;
(d)at 10.30 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 28th March;
(2) the proceedings shall be taken in the order shown in the first column of the following Table and shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the time specified in the second column of the Table.
  Proceedings Time for conclusion of proceedings  Clause 1; Schedule 1; Clause 2; Schedule 2; Clauses 3 to 6; Schedule 3; new Clauses relating to Part 1; new Schedules relating to Part 15.00 p.m. on Tuesday 21st MarchProceedings Time for conclusion of proceedings  Clause 7; Schedule 4; Clauses 8 to 10; Schedule 5; Clauses 11 to 13; new Clauses relating to Part 2; new Schedules relating to Part 2; Clause 14; Schedule 6; Clauses 15 to 20; Schedule 7; new Clauses relating to Part 3; new Schedules relating to Part 3; Clauses 21 to 28; Schedule 8; Clauses 29 and 30; Schedule 9; Clause 31; Schedule 10; Clause 32; new Clauses relating to Part 4; new Schedules relating to Part 4; Clauses 33 to 37; Schedule 11; Clauses 38 and 39; Schedule 12; new Clauses relating to Part 5; new Schedules relating to Part 5; Clauses 40 to 43; Schedules 13 and 14; Clauses 44 to 46; remaining new Clauses; remaining new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill7.00 p.m. on Tuesday 28th March I am delighted to have the opportunity to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. Conway, and that of your esteemed co-Chair, Mr. Pope. I am sure that we shall have extremely constructive discussions about the Bill and I look forward to them. I welcome the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Nick Herbert) and look forward to debating with him. I also welcome the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Clegg)—[Hon. Members: “Cheltenham.”] I am sorry. I welcome the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) to his position as Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
The motion gives us enough time to enable proper scrutiny of this important Bill, which takes forward key strands of our police reform programme and includes significant provisions to implement parts of the respect action plan. At its heart, the Bill is about building safer communities. Indeed, had matters been left to me, it might have been entitled the Safer Communities Bill. That was not to be, however, so we now have the Police and Justice Bill.
Judging from the contributions on Second Reading, we can anticipate lively discussions about the membership and functions of police authorities and the changes to the Home Secretary’s existing reserve powers to intervene in poorly performing police forces and police authorities, and hon. Members will no doubt consider those provisions against the backdrop of police restructuring. Clearly, the Bill is not primarily about police restructuring, but I anticipate that hon. Members will want to raise related issues. I hope that the Committee will be able to do justice to other provisions, particularly those that widen the number of agencies that can issue parenting contracts and those that strengthen the conditional caution scheme, which will help us to build respect.
I welcome the broad support expressed on Second Reading for the new justice, community safety and custody inspectorate, but hon. Members will want to satisfy themselves about the details of that body. The same will apply to provisions relating to the collection  of passenger data, which the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone) mentioned on Second Reading.
Finally, although this issue is not touched on directly in schedule 12, which amends the Extradition Act 2003, I look forward to the opportunity to bring greater clarity to the often misinformed debate about United Kingdom and American extradition arrangements.

Nick Herbert: It is a great pleasure to be under your chairmanship, Mr. Conway. Programme motions are much in the news. Personally, I dislike the idea that the scrutiny of legislation will automatically be brought to a close before we have seen how much debate is necessary. Despite the fact that we supported the Bill on Second Reading, my hon. Friends and I have several concerns about it, which merit full debate. The Minister alluded to some of the more contentious issues, and the Home Secretary’s powers to reshape and intervene directly in police authorities have provoked great controversy and concern, not least on the part of the Association of Police Authorities. The proposals for a joint inspectorate have also given rise to concerns, which have been expressed not only in the House, but by a number of professional bodies. In particular, anxiety was felt about the prisons inspectorate and the need to retain its special role. The extension of summary power and the exercising of such powers on the part of police officers has not been debated properly by Parliament, and that is a feature of the Bill.
The Bill’s provisions for amending the Extradition Act may not in themselves be controversial, but we will take the opportunity to examine the issues raised on Second Reading about US-UK extradition arrangements. There is plainly disagreement between the Government, my party and, I believe, the Liberal Democrats about the fairness of those arrangements. I suspect that we will find that debate is tight. Debate on part 1 will be allowed for only three and a bit sittings and the most contentious provisions—clause 2 and schedule 2—fall within that part, which suggests that we may have quite a job. Nevertheless, the programme motion is a done deal and we have to accept it. In view of the fact that I have said that we will have little time for debate, I would rather not detain the Committee any further with my protest.

Lynne Featherstone: I and my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham look forward to serving under your jurisdiction, Mr. Conway, and under that of Mr. Pope. The time available is severely short considering the number of issues that are likely to arise and that did arise on Second Reading. Although we, too, did not call a Division or vote against the Bill and gave our tacit support, we made it quite clear that without substantial amendment we would have trouble with a number of issues. The hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs has referred to most of them, but particularly concerning is the Home Secretary’s desire to intervene without a negative report in the work of both police authorities and police services.
We have concerns about the information on domestic flights, the quality issues that emerge from the joining of the inspectorates and the change of balance between the state and the individual, as well as summary justice. We, too, want to examine more closely the issue of fairness and extradition. I do not want to detain the Committee with debate at this point, but I feel obliged to say that it is a shame to close down debate on such important issues.

Hazel Blears: I am delighted at the degree of consensus. I am pleased that both Opposition Members do not seek to contest the programme motion and I hope that the Committee can continue in that constructive and consensual manner. I am not entirely convinced that that will last throughout our proceedings, but I hope that we can go on as we started.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 - National Policing Improvement Agency

Nick Herbert: I beg to move amendment No. 61, in clause 1, page 1, line 9, at end insert—
‘(c)the Police Standards Unit.’.
This is a probing amendment. I want to raise the issue of the extent to which a plethora of bodies will continue to direct or seek to give guidance to police forces and police authorities, despite the Government’s intention to set up a national policing improvement agency. The Home Office White Paper “Building Communities, Beating Crime” stated that a strong prerequisite for the establishment of the agency was the rationalisation of the landscape of national organisations. The idea that two organisations are to be subsumed within the new agency commands reasonably broad support. However, other bodies will continue working alongside the agency. For example, the Police Standards Unit will remain as a body within the Home Office.
We need to discuss the relationship between the Police Standards Unit and the inspectorate of constabulary to be subsumed by the new inspectorate. We may be able to do that when we discuss the inspectorate. The question, however, is whether we need a separate standards unit as well as the improvement agency, and we need to consider the extent to which their functions will overlap. After all, both will seek to drive up police standards and performance, the agency more by advice and guidance and the Police Standards Unit more through intervention. My question is whether it is really necessary to have both bodies, and I shall listen with interest to what the Minister has to say.
The Minister said in evidence to the Home Affairs Committee last year:
“I have no intention of having the Improvement Agency and still having this myriad of different organisations”.
I do not think that she was referring specifically to the Police Standards Unit. The Government have stated that the inspectorate and the standards unit have separate and complementary roles, but the Home  Affairs Committee believes that a strong case can be made for rationalising the many agencies, and that it would be desirable—even inevitable—that the inspectorate and the standards unit eventually merged. Were that to be the case, I would be less concerned about separating the standards unit and the improvement agency, but it is proposed that three bodies, not to mention the Audit Commission, should be able to intervene in police forces in one way or another.
Dr. Kevin Bond, former director of the Police Standards Unit, said that the unit was created to act as a catalyst in the police service, and that the proposal to merge the standards unit and Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary made sense. That statement was contradicted by the current director, Paul Evans, who said that the standards unit works out of the Home Office and that the constabulary is independent.
Other concerns have been expressed by professional bodies about the potential for duplication. The Association of Chief Police Officers noted a
“considerable overlap and duplication of resources”
between it, the standards unit, the National Centre for Policing Excellence and the Home Office. The APA has expressed concern at the level of monitoring, inspection and auditing currently being undertaken, and the number of those engaging in such roles centrally, including the standards unit, the Home Office, the inspectorate and the Audit Commission. The APA said
“There is undoubtedly scope to streamline and reduce radically the extent of such activity”.
That view is supported by the Police Federation, which claims that there is a considerable degree of overlap between the Police Standards Unit, the Audit Commission and HMIC, which could lead to a “costly duplication of effort”. The Home Affairs Committee noted that
“the overlapping remits can paradoxically create holes through which important work may fall”.
That is the danger of having a multiplicity of organisations with overlapping tasks. Not only can there be too much interference with the bodies concerned—in this case, the police forces and authorities—but there could be confusion as to who should be responsible for certain matters.
I am not persuaded. I have heard no argument as to why the Police Standards Unit should remain separate from the new improvement agency. The purpose of the amendment is to suggest that it should be one of the organisations to be abolished—in other words, it should be subsumed by the new agency.
It would have helped us if the full regulatory impact assessment on the national policing improvement agency had been published. Unless I am mistaken, in which case, I am sure the Minister will put me right, it has not been. It is certainly not published on the Home Office website. However, the overarching regulatory impact assessment for the Bill says that
“A full RIA on the National Policing Improvement Agency will be published in due course.”
Such an RIA would have set out the costs and benefits of setting up the agency. It would also have addressed the issue of whether other organisations were performing similar roles, and the relationship between them. However, that assessment is not available to us now, on our first opportunity to scrutinise in detail the basis for the establishment and operation of the improvement agency. Am I correct that the impact assessment has not been published? If so, why is that, and can the Minister tell us when it will be available to the Committee?

Hazel Blears: The national policing improvement agency is to be a police-owned and led organisation that supports self-improvement in forces, particularly on front-line policing. As such, it will not take direct control of the mechanisms for monitoring police performance, nor will it be responsible for police performance management at national level. Those functions should remain firmly with the Police Standards Unit of the Home Office. Of course, the two bodies will need to establish a close working relationship. All of us, on our constituents’ behalf, have an interest in making sure that police performance continues to improve, as it has done over the past few years. The Police Standards Unit has a good record in that regard, and I should like to give the Committee a little evidence of that.
In any event, the Police Standards Unit is not a statutory body and could not be abolished by the amendment—I accept that it is a probing amendment. The Police Standards Unit has a key role to play in identifying for the Home Secretary performance variations across the service, and the capacity to reduce those variations. Hon. Members will know that one of our key targets is to reduce crime generally, and to reduce crime further in high-crime areas. It is important to us to have a body that can spot the variations between low-crime and high-crime areas.
Since the unit was created in 2002, it has demonstrated its value. It has led on the creation of the police performance assessment framework, with which, no doubt, the Committee will become increasingly familiar as we go through the Bill. It is unbelievable that, until a few years ago, we did not have a national police performance assessment framework. In the past few years, that has been incredibly useful in driving up police performance.
The Police Standards Unit’s work enables it to spot performance variations. It can respond in a targeted way where necessary. The eight forces with which the unit has worked have reduced crime by twice as much as the average of other forces—11.4 per cent., compared with 4.6 per cent more generally. That shows that, once the unit engages constructively with forces, it can come up with tactics, strategies and ways of working that they can use.

Michael Fabricant: Can the Minister clarify the relationship between the agency and Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary? There must be some  overlap in their activity. In which ways do they co-operate, and are there any strains between the two organisations?

Hazel Blears: That is a good question, and I welcome the opportunity to clarify the situation. HMIC undertakes broad inspections of the whole service. It makes annual baseline reports, so it looks at performance across the piece. Inevitably, that is done over a longer time than the work of the Police Standards Unit. Her Majesty’s inspectorate also does thematic inspections—into call handling and other specific issues, for example—in order to give us a snapshot of the performance of different forces. The Police Standards Unit can act like a radar, so that when forces start to drift in their performance it can target them immediately. At the moment, it is engaged with some basic command units, not necessarily the whole force. There could be a basic command unit in which things are not going well, and in some of our city BCUs that can account for a huge proportion of crime across the force. The Police Standards Unit is quick to act and has the performance monitoring information, so if there are problems in that BCU, it can get in.
The Police Standards Unit has done that consensually. It has not been a heavy-handed organisation, although people originally had fears that it might be and that it would trample over the service. In fact, we are probably at the point now where, although the Police Standards Unit might not be welcomed, once it is engaged, most forces feel that it is very useful. There is a difference, but it is important that there should be close working relationships between HMIC, the Police Standards Unit and the national policing improvement agency, when it is up and running.
I said to the Home Affairs Committee that I wanted to rationalise, to use the jargon, the policing landscape. The fact that the NPIA will take over the functions of Centrex and the Police Information Technology Organisation, which are significant and large organisations, should be generally welcome.

Martin Horwood: I am intrigued by the Minister’s response. If she is saying that the Police Standards Unit is necessary because it can spot performance variations among forces, is she also saying that the new national policing improvement agency will not be able do so, when it is responsible for the
“development and promulgation of good practice”
and for giving “expert advice” to forces? Surely it would make sense for the spotting of performance variations to be incorporated into the same body that provides advice on the basis of it.

Hazel Blears: We will have an opportunity to discuss those very issues when we come to the hon. Gentleman’s amendments that deal with monitoring performance. The NPIA is not a performance-monitoring body; it is police-owned and police-led, developing products and good practice. It is important that the monitoring of performance does not take place within the same organisation that is there to help the police. It is important to have the rigour of external  scrutiny, which will take place through the new inspectorate and the Police Standards Unit. I hope that the hon. Gentleman would acknowledge that we can improve our public services by having good external drivers and internal improvement processes that are owned by the force. There is a perfectly logical and effective distinction between the roles that the various organisations will play.
A practical example of how the Police Standards Unit has assisted forces is its recent work with about a quarter of forces to help to improve their sanction detection rates. The average performance improvement in those forces has been around double that of the forces with which the unit has not worked. Detection rates increased by 4.4 per cent., as against 2.3 per cent., from September 2004 to November 2005. All hon. Members will be concerned about detection rates. It is important to drive them up and the Police Standards Unit has been able to do so.
The Police Standards Unit has been dealing with some issues that may well go across to the NPIA as it develops. The dissemination of good practice on the development of automatic number plate recognition is another example that involves internal improvements to the force. There will be a resettling of functions and organisation as the new agency starts to work. Getting that settlement right will be important for future performance, and not muddling performance monitoring with self-improvement is key. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs to withdraw the amendment and, if not, for the Committee to oppose it.

Nick Herbert: I must say that I do not feel very enlightened. The more the Minister spoke, the more I thought that we need to consider further the extent to which the various bodies will overlap. We will have the opportunity to do that when we come to the inspectorate.
The Minister said that the purpose of the inspectorate was to conduct broader inspections, but the Home Office says that the first purpose of the Police Standards Unit is to measure and compare police performance. It has also the function of identifying and disseminating good practice across the country—the Prime Minister himself said that. However, one of the stated aims of the national policing improvement agency is to improve professional practice and
“ensure that national policing best practice is identified, evaluated and understood by police officers and police staff”.
The Minister cannot sweep aside so easily the fact that there is clearly potential overlap between those bodies.
I shall return to the regulatory impact assessment. The Minister might wish to intervene on me to let me know what the position is because she did not refer to it in her remarks.

Hazel Blears: Perhaps I can assist the Committee—I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. We expect to publish the regulatory impact assessment before Report, and I will endeavour to ensure that we do that as quickly as we can. I understand that that is important to hon. Members.

Nick Herbert: I am grateful to the Minister for that reply, which has plainly put the skids on her officials. However, the truth is that that is not good enough. If I may say so, as a new Member, the purpose of the Committee stage is to scrutinise carefully the provisions of a Bill. If a regulatory impact assessment is to be produced on a specific measure that forms part of a single clause—the first clause—it should be available to the Committee. That impact assessment goes directly to the substance of the concerns that I and others have raised about the potential overlap between the organisations concerned. The impact assessment would consider whether creating another organisation is justifiable, or whether further amalgamation is a possibility.
The Minister might have a case. Those bodies might well have separate roles, but I am not persuaded. We have not been assisted by the brevity of her answer or the fact that the impact assessment is unavailable. I am grateful to her for saying that it will be available before Report, but in future, such impact assessments should be made available before Second Reading, and certainly before Committee stage.
Last week, I introduced a private Member’s Bill that would put regulatory impact assessments on a statutory footing so that the Government were required to publish them, rather than leaving it to discretion. The fact that the assessment has not been published is plainly in breach of Cabinet Office guidance. I am sure that the Minister will take that on board.
On the substance of my amendment, I can see that we will not make any progress this morning. We have an opportunity to return to the matter when we consider the inspectorate, and perhaps by then, we will have collected our thoughts about the extent to which the bodies overlap. We will not have the impact assessment to assist us, and we will need to take further advice from outside bodies about the extent to which they consider the overlap to be a problem.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 - National Policing improvement Agency

Lynne Featherstone: I beg to move amendment No. 49, in schedule 1, page 37, line 24, at end insert
‘and
(iv)monitoring and reporting continuous improvement in the exercise of functions, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness;’.

Derek Conway: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 83, in schedule 1, page 40, line 11, leave out subparagraph (3).
No. 84, in schedule 1, page 40, leave out line 33 and insert—
‘(d)persons whom the Agency considers to represent the interests of police officers of police forces in England and Wales.’.

Lynne Featherstone: This is a probing amendment to examine, in terms that we will understand, what is best value, and under what terms the national policing improvement agency will operate. It relates to a later amendment to clause 3 that looks at the regime under which police authorities might be asked to perform. We are uncertain about the regime under which the agency will work—is it a best value organisation?
We suggest that the national policing improvement agency should have a clear duty to promote best practice, provide support, monitor and report on outcomes, but through the amendment it would not actually be tied up in best value itself. We are focusing on continuous improvement. We want to probe the Government and the Minister about what the standards will be and why, and how they will be promoted by the agency.

James Brokenshire: Amendment No. 83 is a probing amendment intended to establish the scope and latitude of the new agency. In the 2004 Government White Paper, the Home Office said:
“The Agency will have clear authority to deliver in the following three core areas: good practice development ... an implementation support function ... and operational policing support.”
Paragraph 5(3) of schedule 1 sets it out that the strategic priorities determined by the agency in its annual plan will be subject to paragraph 6, which allows the Secretary of State to make directions regarding what priorities the Secretary of State thinks the agency should have. That raises the question of what scope and latitude the agency will have to come up with its own independent thoughts?
My concerns are highlighted by the fact that the Secretary of State has wide-ranging powers effectively to set the membership of the agency in terms of who is appointed and what work they do. In addition, while the agency is required, when drawing up its plan, to consult with certain bodies, including police authorities, the Secretary of State is able to direct the priorities of police authorities. I am sure that we will come to that in later consideration and debate.
Is the agency supposed merely to draw up or implement priorities that are set by the Secretary of State because of provisions in the schedule, or is it intended to have some greater ability to come up with its own priorities, given that its objects are set out clearly in paragraph 1, which is the guiding principle that sets out what the agency seeks to do? One could argue that, provided that the objects are right, it should be for the agency to interpret and come up with its priorities based on those objects and its consultations with the Secretary of State and other bodies.
There must be robustness and clarity of direction regarding the agency’s aims. That brings us back to paragraph 46 of the schedule, which we will debate later, which also appears to give the Secretary of State wide-ranging powers to change the whole make-up and situation of the agency. With amendment No. 83, I seek clarification on where the agency sits, what its  ability to come up with strategic priorities is, and whether it is heavily hemmed in. If it comes up with priorities that the Secretary of State may not like, will it be told that it cannot have those priorities despite thinking that they are important and should be developed and advanced? I hope that the Minister will clarify what will be the scope and operation of the agency.
Amendment No. 84 follows on from amendment No. 83. With it, I want to ensure that in delivering the work that it seeks to do, the agency will consult sufficiently widely in drawing up its plan. Paragraph 5(7) requires the agency to consult
“the Secretary of State ... persons whom the Agency considers to represent the interests of police authorities”
and
“persons whom the Agency considers to represent the interests of chief officers of police”.
Although there is a catch-all provision relating to other persons whom the agency might reasonably consult in drawing up its annual plan, priorities and strategic objectives, including the objectives of individual police forces, and in delivering on the purpose for which it was set up, it would be sensible to make specific provision to require the agency to consult bodies representing ordinary officers. Chief police officers will have a senior managerial perspective on the delivery of high-quality policing in their areas, and police authorities will have a slightly different picture. However, if we are to deliver good practice and high-quality, effective police services on the ground and to achieve safer communities and the reduction of crime that the Minister said were among the objectives of the Bill, it is important to ensure that the agency consults ordinary police officers.
It is interesting that the Police Federation has raised the issue. In its briefing paper for the Bill, it said:
“Since the 1919 Police Act the Police Federation has been consulted on all policing matters on a part-statute/part-goodwill basis. It should be noted that the objects of the agency ... “the promulgation of good practice in policing”—overlaps to a certain degree with the statutory role of the Police Federation to ensure the efficiency of police officers.
The NPIA’s work will impact on the whole service and it is important that the whole service has an input, particularly in respect to training and personnel issues ... where the Police Federation has a great deal of knowledge and experience.”
As I suggested, paragraph 5(6)(d) enables consultation with
“such other persons as the Agency considers appropriate”,
but I hope that we shall be given some assurance that organisations such as the Police Federation will be regarded as appropriate organisations for consultation. I hope that we shall ensure that ordinary officers have an input and that the whole police family is properly taken into account when the agency’s objective are set.

Hazel Blears: Before I reply on the detail of the amendments, let me try to reassure all hon. Members by saying that the introduction of the national policing improvement agency was originally suggested by the Association of Chief Police Officers, and I was very willing to take that suggestion on board. If people in the police service feel that the agency is owned and led  by them and that it is right at the heart of policing, it will be far more successful than an attempt by Ministers to impose their will on the service. I am an absolute believer in the power of collaboration, with people coming together to share ideas and then drive forward continuous improvement.
However, it is important that we get the settlement of the relationship right. As we explore the amendments, hon. Members may come to a wider understanding of the depth of agreement across the service about where the balance properly lies. We have a tripartite agreement about policing, with a clear role for the Home Secretary, chief constables and police authorities. That is a wholly unique feature of British policing, and it is extremely important to me. Getting that balance right is a challenge for us all.
Amendment No. 49, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green, would give the NPIA the additional function of monitoring police forces’ compliance with best value. We will consider police authorities’ duties under clause 3 because best value relates to them, but I do not regard that as being a proper function of the agency. As I said to the hon. Member for Cheltenham, performance monitoring is not a role for the agency; it is about self-improvement.
Under part 1 of the Local Government Act 1999, responsibility for inspecting police authorities’ compliance rests with the Audit Commission and HMIC. In future, police authorities will be jointly inspected by the Audit Commission and the new justice, community safety and custody inspectorate. As a non-departmental public body, the NPIA will not be subject to best-value provisions itself. It will have to show that it is efficient and effective and that it is using its resources properly. It will be accountable to the Home Office for the way in which it uses its resources, but it will not be subject to the best value regime, which, in statutory terms, relates to local government and to police authorities. We will not therefore be able to accept the amendment.
On amendment No. 83, I cannot accept that the priorities determined annually by the NPIA should not be consistent with the Home Secretary’s strategic priorities for the agency. We need to get the balance right. If the agency was able to set priorities inconsistent with the Home Secretary’s strategic priorities, we would create a recipe for tensions and the fracturing of our settlement almost from the outset. That does not mean that the NPIA will not have a role in horizon scanning, looking at the threats coming towards us in the next few years, anticipating them and preparing to deal with them. I expect the agency to raise matters as a result of its investment in research or as it looks ahead for us.
Setting strategic priorities for the police service as a whole, and for national agencies such as the Serious Organised Crime Agency and the NPIA, is an entirely proper function for the Home Secretary. That is what Governments are elected to do. In our tripartite arrangement, the Government, through the Home Secretary, have a clear role to set strategic priorities for  the police service as a whole. At the end of the day, we are accountable to Parliament for such matters. It is right that there is that process.

Martin Horwood: I beg the Minister’s pardon for not responding immediately to what she said, because it took me a moment to take it in. I think that she has slightly missed the point of amendment No. 49. She may be right to say that the NPIA is not a best value authority, but the amendment would not impose that. If the NPIA is intended to offer support on matters such as best practice, quality management, excellence management and business excellence models, it should not be encumbered by best value bureaucracy. Surely the amendment does not impose such a requirement, but simply says that such activity could be one of the responsibilities of the NPIA. For instance, it could, if it wanted, recommend not best value but something such as the European Foundation for Quality Management’s business excellence model as a way of improving performance.

Derek Conway: Order. The hon. Gentleman may make an intervention, because of the nature of the Committee. If he is not happy with what the Minister says, however, I am sure that he will catch my eye to make his own, more substantive, contribution, but interventions must be brief.

Hazel Blears: I am at pains not to add more bureaucracy to our system. In fact, the purpose of introducing the NPIA is to try to strip out some duplication. The hon. Gentleman suggests that the agency may want to recommend certain models of organisation. Clearly, that will be part of its function in developing best practice. It is taking over responsibility for the National Centre for Policing Excellence, which prepares codes of practice. It may well want to act as he suggests. The amendment that I sought to reject would put an additional duty on the agency to monitor police forces’ compliance. I do not see the agency as being about monitoring compliance and performance. That is a role for other persons. Indeed, clause 3 will remove the best value bureaucracy for police authorities, and we will come on to that.
I have no objection to the new agency’s developing models of practice that, if implemented across the service, will make us more efficient and effective. That is exactly what I want it to do. However, I do not want to constrain it by putting it under more burdens, particularly under the best value regime.

James Brokenshire: I am grateful for the right hon. Lady’s clarification on the setting of the strategic objectives by the Secretary of State. How does she envisage the priorities of the agency under paragraph 5(2)(a) and (b) differing in practice from the strategic priorities of the Secretary of State? What is the difference between the two?

Hazel Blears: At the moment we have a national policing plan. As required by statute, the Home Secretary has to publish the policing plan every year, which sets out his strategic priorities for the police service. The Bill will abolish that requirement to try to streamline the bureaucracy. We recently launched a national community safety plan, which is different from the policing plan because it is a cross-agency plan that recognises that much work done by the police is not simply police business. Incorporated in that plan there is still a policing plan; that is necessary. In future, however, the Home Secretary may want to issue his statutory priorities through the community safety plan, which draws in all agencies. It will inevitably deal with fairly high-level priorities, perhaps in connection with neighbourhood policing. That is certainly one of our priorities, as is tackling antisocial behaviour.
The agency may come up with some priorities that, although consistent with the high-level issues, will involve more detail or be focused on a particular area or impending threat. An issue relevant to street crime, for example, was that growth in mobile phone ownership led to an increase in street robberies involving mobile phones. The agency may identify a similar threat and come up with good practice, tactics and strategy for tackling such an issue. That would be perfectly consistent with the Home Secretary’s strategic priorities on reducing crime.
That is how I see the relationship developing: the Home Secretary will set high-level priorities, but the agency may want to come up with other issues. Those, however, should be consistent with the Home Secretary’s priorities, and not diverge from matters on which the Government properly want to make progress. The agency might develop training packages to give people specific skills to deal with new threats. I envisage it doing a great deal of work on IT, an area in which there is a need for improvements, greater consistency and an ability to implement solutions throughout the police service. There will be many areas in which the agency will, I hope, be imaginative and come up with ideas.
I am very excited by the prospect of the agency. It is the first opportunity that has been presented to us to obtain a solution, across the police service, to many of our pressing problems. I hope that we shall be more effective, and gain economies of scale, as a result of implementation, and I hope that hon. Members would welcome that.
Amendment No. 84 concerns the duty placed on the NPIA to consult in the preparation of its annual plan. The amendment would add the Police Federation and the Police Superintendents Association. I am sure that it is not his intention but that would remove the agency’s ability to consult other stakeholders that it might consider appropriate. It would close off the ability to consult.
I can give the hon. Gentleman, and indeed the Committee, the assurance that the chief executive, Peter Neyroud, will consult all the staff associations and the Police Federation, whose members are often at the sharp end. In most organisations, the people who  deal with problems day to day often have good ideas about how to make improvements. Involving the Police Federation, which is very constructive, will be important. Superintendents, many of whom are basic command unit commanders, will be central to police reform and therefore need to be involved as well. There will be consultations with the chief officers body, Unison, the National Black Police Association, the British Association for Women in Policing and a range of staff associations.
In addition, and importantly, I want to ensure that the agency will consult not just with people already involved in policing. If we are to have a customer focus in the police service, which I believe to be important, the agency should consult the public about what they want from a policing service. That approach of involving all the agencies in policing and studying how to make the service more effective for the public is crucial. I hope that with those assurances the hon. Lady will feel inclined to withdraw the amendment.

Lynne Featherstone: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

James Brokenshire: On a point of order, Mr. Conway. Will you clarify the grouping of amendments, and explain whether, if amendments are dealt with as part of a group, it is possible to withdraw them formally?

Derek Conway: It is not necessary for an hon. Member to seek to withdraw an amendment that has been grouped with the first amendment under discussion. The discussion takes place on the group. If an hon. Member wishes to divide the Committee on a particular amendment, I put it in the order in which the matter appears in the Bill. For example, we shall now discuss the Government amendments, but I shall not put those amendments when I put amendment No. 63. If there is to be a division, I shall call it later, when it appears in the Bill. If the hon. Gentleman wished to divide the Committee on amendments Nos. 83 and 84, I should have been happy to enable him to do that. However, as he did not indicate that that was his wish, I did not. He does not have to withdraw his amendment, but if he would like to divide the Committee, he can indicate as much and I shall put it formally.

James Brokenshire: Further to that point of order, Mr. Conway. I do not want to divide the Committee on the issue. My reason for asking was that I wanted formally to withdraw the points that I had made on the basis of the assurance that the Minister had given in relation to consultation. That was very helpful, and I am grateful for her clarification.
In relation to my previous amendment, while I heard what the Minister said about the intention and the fact that it is not proposed that the measure be used as a means of micromanaging the agency, my concern  remains, and we may well return to the matter. Thank you very much, Mr. Conway, for your guidance on procedure.

Nick Herbert: I beg to move amendment No. 63, in schedule 1, page 41, line 43, at end insert—
‘(4A)The Secretary of State must exercise his power under sub-paragraph (1)(c) to ensure that at all times a majority of the members are non-executive.’.

Derek Conway: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 64, in page 43, line 2, leave out paragraph 13 and insert—
‘13(1)The chairman and members of the Agency shall appoint the chief executive.
(2)Before doing so, they shall consult the Secretary of State. (3)The chief executive of the Agency shall be a member of its staff.’. Government amendment Nos. 1 to 3. Nick Herbert: I cannot resist commenting on the fact that the Minister says that she is excited by the establishment of a national policing improvement agency. I wonder whether that excitement will be shared outside the House. One thing I have noticed is the way in which it is possible, even after only a few months as a Member of Parliament, to lapse into jargon. I suspect that that leaves our constituents, who are worried about whether there are police officers on their streets, and about local crime levels and antisocial behaviour, wondering what we are talking about and whether it has any real meaning. The Minister told us that the NPIA is an NDPB, which replaces the NCPE and PITO. It was proposed by ACPO and will work alongside HMIC and the PSU. APA welcomes it. We could go on. I wonder about the more arcane deliberations in this House. Nevertheless, I accept that in so far as driving up the standards of the police is important, the agency is important. We would prefer a less centralised model, and I shall return to that later.
(3)The chief executive of the Agency shall be a member of its staff.’.
Government amendment Nos. 1 to 3.

Nick Herbert: I cannot resist commenting on the fact that the Minister says that she is excited by the establishment of a national policing improvement agency. I wonder whether that excitement will be shared outside the House. One thing I have noticed is the way in which it is possible, even after only a few months as a Member of Parliament, to lapse into jargon. I suspect that that leaves our constituents, who are worried about whether there are police officers on their streets, and about local crime levels and antisocial behaviour, wondering what we are talking about and whether it has any real meaning. The Minister told us that the NPIA is an NDPB, which replaces the NCPE and PITO. It was proposed by ACPO and will work alongside HMIC and the PSU. APA welcomes it. We could go on. I wonder about the more arcane deliberations in this House. Nevertheless, I accept that in so far as driving up the standards of the police is important, the agency is important. We would prefer a less centralised model, and I shall return to that later.
The amendments relate to the structure of the national policing improvement agency, and how it is governed. They draw on the Association of Police Authorities’s concerns about that body’s constitution. Amendment No. 63 suggests that there should always be a majority of non-executive members on the agency’s board. That is a perfectly sensible suggestion, and it is in tune with the principles of corporate governance, which I think should apply to all such organisations. It is never a good idea for an executive team to have a majority on a board. The Bill already makes provision for the constitution of the board, so it would be sensible to provide that non-executives are represented at all times.
Amendment No. 64 proposes what might be a more contentious change—that the agency’s chief executive should be appointed by the board, not by the Secretary of State. The Minister stressed that she wanted the agency to be owned by the police. The White Paper states:
“It is essential that the culture of the Agency should be professionally driven but outward looking”.
The Minister also said that Ministers should not impede the will of the police or the expression of that will through the agency. Those wishes will be compromised if the Government appoint the chief executive.
If the agency is to be truly owned by police forces—however many remain after the Minister has finished her round of amalgamation—it would make sense to allow the expression of that ownership by letting the board appoint the chief executive. That is not possible now, because an acting chief executive has already been appointed, and I certainly do not seek to disparage him. Given the plethora of central control and intervention that already exists, however, if police forces are to have confidence in the body as one that they can shape and direct, having a chief executive who is not imposed on them—albeit one on whom consultation is provided for in the schedule—would be a good principle. I should be interested to hear why the Minister thinks that a bad idea.

Hazel Blears: On amendment No. 63, I assure the hon. Gentleman that we intend to have a non-executive majority on the board of the NPIA. That is important, as it will bring a wider perspective to its work and will provide for the input of different views and for effective oversight and rigorous governance. I want to ensure that those factors are properly embedded in the provisions for the new agency, so that executives are subject to proper scrutiny. I want to ensure that we are delivering.
The hon. Gentleman says that the introduction of the agency may not be exciting for our constituents. Most of our constituents are extremely concerned to ensure that policing is efficient and effective, and that the police are reducing crime and making our communities safer, ensuring that we get the very best value from our massive investment in the last few years. The agency will help us to do that. I think that the introduction of the agency is exciting, therefore, although I apologise if my use of police acronyms reduces the excitement. If the hon. Gentleman would like me to, I can spell them all out, but the Committee would need in excess of eight sittings if I did so, and we could be sitting until midnight. None the less, I have, I think, a reputation for fairly plain speaking, and I shall do my best to continue that.
I give the hon. Gentleman the assurance that he sought. The Bill provides that the chief executive should be a member of the board.

Nick Herbert: I was referring to our collective use of acronyms. I did not intend to criticise the Minister.
On amendment No. 63, I am grateful for the Minister’s assurance that the Government intend that there should always be a majority of non-executive members on the board. Would it not be a good idea to write that into the schedule? If that is the Government’s intention, that would seem a fair thing to do. I see no legal obstacle, and given that the  schedule makes various provisions on how the board is to be constituted, I see no reason why it should not be possible.

Hazel Blears: We create boards in many areas of government, and my officials say that it is not the practice to write such a provision into legislation. It would to some extent be superfluous because the Home Secretary will make those appointments, and I have given the undertaking and assurance that we intend to ensure that non-executive members are in a majority. At this point, I do not feel that there is a need to spell that out on the face of the Bill. I am clear about the need for proper scrutiny of the agency’s executive management .
The fact that the chief executive will be a member of the board is perfectly proper. That is in accordance with the guidance from the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. Other members will include the chair and those appointed by the Secretary of State.
In relation to amendment No. 64, the chief executive of the agency is a critical appointment for the future of policing—it really is a serious appointment. That decision should fall to the Home Secretary, but there is provision for consultation with all policing partners when making that appointment. The Association of Chief Police Officers and the Association of Police Authorities were part of the interviewing panel when Peter Neyroud was appointed as shadow chief executive of the agency, and they had a full opportunity to make clear their views on that appointment. Again, I can give an undertaking that that procedure will be adopted for future appointments—involving people on the interviewing committee is important. However, the final decision should rest with the Secretary of State.

Martin Horwood: In answer to amendment No. 61, the Minister said—I think that I am quoting her exactly—that that body was going to be “police-owned and led”. How can that be the case if the appointment is made from on high?

Hazel Blears: I hope that, as we go through the Bill, the hon. Gentleman will develop a more sensitive understanding of the balance of relationships in our police service. The agency will be police-owned and led in the development of practice, training packages, products to support operational policing and other activities relevant to the police service. That is why we envisage that many police officers will have an input into the agency. Some of them will become associate directors for a time and lead some of the programmes, so it will be police-owned and led.
Chief constables will be on the board of the agency and they will have a real say. However, there has to be a recognition of the tripartite relationship—the police officers themselves, the police authorities and the Home Secretary, who is accountable to Parliament and the country for ensuring an effective police service.  Therefore, there needs to be the right balance between who makes the big decisions and who implements them in the service.
The appointment of the chief executive of the national policing improvement agency is so important to the future of policing that it is right and proper that the Home Secretary should make it. It will be crucial also to get the right balance of skills between the chair of the agency and the chief executive. Again, that is why it is important that the Home Secretary is involved.
As I said, the Home Secretary will not make the appointment in isolation. There will be full consultation—that is the right way forward. If the agency were to appoint the chief executive, we could be in danger of losing that connection with the Home Secretary, who sets the strategic priorities for the police service. Those relationships and connections must be strong, open and transparent, and everyone must understand where the balance lies.

James Brokenshire: My concern about the Minister’s comments is regarding micromanagement—I alluded to that in discussing my previous amendment. If the Secretary of State can set the strategic objectives and appoint the chief executive, the impression is given of central control. What assurance can she give that that will not lead to micromanagement by the Home Office?

Hazel Blears: I can certainly give the assurance that the ability of the Home Secretary to set priorities is strategic, and therefore it will be high-level and not about micromanagement of delivery on the ground. There is a clear distinction, giving the police service the freedom to get on and do its job, but within a framework that says, for example, that we want to reduce crime everywhere and more in high-crime areas. It is perfectly proper for the Home Secretary to set that kind of priority and then to work with organisations to see how we can deliver.
I will probably say this at least 100 times as we go through the Bill: we are talking not about centralisation, but about trying to ensure that we have a robust regime that drives performance. If we take a hands-off approach and say that the Home Secretary, Ministers and the Government are to have no control at all, we will to some extent leave the service without the sense of direction that it welcomes to take it forward, and leave communities vulnerable to variable strategies and tactics and different levels of performance. It is not right that some of the most vulnerable communities that are still subject to crime levels that are too high should be left without the support and back-up that our police service can provide.

Lynne Featherstone: Does not the Minister accept that that level of control might blur the balance between political and operational issues?

Hazel Blears: I am sure that we shall come on to decisions about possible politicisation of the police when we debate some of the amendments concerning directly elected police authorities. I am not in favour of  politicising the police service. It is important that it has the freedom to get on with the job. However, I am absolutely convinced that it is the Government’s responsibility not only to ensure that the police service has the facilities that it needs, but to set the direction in which we want it to go.
I make no apologies for saying that the Government have an important role in making communities safer, reducing crime, bringing more offences to justice and securing better detection rates. To abandon that and say, “That’s not our responsibility—it’s a matter for somebody else” is an abrogation of our responsibilities as an elected Government. There is a balance. There is a completely proper role for Government, which we can debate.
Government amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are designed to allow the NPIA to recruit police officers directly, in addition to engaging them on secondment. That is something that Peter Neyroud, the chief executive designate, has specifically asked me to take forward. The reasons for the amendments are threefold.
First, the only alternative to direct recruitment is through secondments. They have their place, but they can lead to instability in an organisation. Sometimes, secondments can be withdrawn at fairly short notice and it is important that the agency has stability in its staffing. Secondments have not been that well taken up in Centrex and PITO, or necessarily enhanced the careers of officers. It is therefore important to have the ability directly to recruit officers who will become permanent members of the NPIA. Again, that will embed a sense of police ownership in the agency, and ensure that the products on which the agency works have a real sense of police ownership.
Secondly, I want the NPIA to be seen as a real career option for officers, providing them with access to a wider range of professional experiences than they would perhaps have by working just in a force. I want a period with the NPIA to be seen as an invaluable addition to an officer’s personal development and career progression. I want people to be fighting to get into the agency, because they see it as a driver of reform and improvement and important to their careers. The NPIA will not be for everyone, but I want to ensure that those officers who want to come in and play a role in transforming our police service have the opportunity to do so.
I want to ensure that the highest calibre of officers can come in. The provisions will give them the flexibility to do that. As far as possible, officers who are directly recruited will be subject to the same regulations as would apply if they were employed by a territorial police force in England or Wales. The biggest exception is probationary officers. I do not believe that working directly in the NPIA would give them the range of experience that they need in the early days of their careers. We are talking about directly recruiting into the agency not probation officers, but fully qualified officers.
Thirdly, the agency’s chief executive will have direction and control of the NPIA’s police officer staff regardless of whether the chief executive is a serving  constable. That approach is not unprecedented. The director of the National Criminal Intelligence Service has control of police officers, irrespective of whether he or she is a chief constable. As it happens, Peter Neyroud is a chief constable and will have direction of police officer staff of the agency, but that might not be the case in the long term. The provision is therefore important.
We will table a related amendment covering complaints and disciplinary procedures in order to achieve parity and alignment with the police service. I apologise that the amendment is not ready for us to debate now, but I will bring it forward on Report. With the amendment, we will seek to ensure that officers will have similar provisions regarding their appointment to the agency.

Nick Herbert: Again, I am not entirely satisfied with the Minister’s response. I accept that it is not usual to stipulate in primary legislation that the majority of a board’s members should be non-executive, which is the substance of amendment No. 63, and I am grateful for her assurance that Ministers intend to ensure that that will be the case.
On amendment No. 64 and the broader point about who owns the NPIA, I think it perfectly respectable to hold the view that Ministers should take powers and seek to direct policing in the way in which the Minister does. I have a different view. It could be argued that that is one way in which policing could be governed. What we cannot do, however, is say that the agency will be owned by the police but that we will appoint all its members and the chief executive. We cannot say that Ministers should not impose their will and then take the powers to do so. Such doublespeak is problematic.
Throughout Second Reading, Ministers constantly asserted that the Bill is a localising or decentralising measure, but it is clear that they are taking greater central powers.

James Brokenshire: My hon. Friend makes an interesting point, which will, I am sure, be a recurring theme throughout our discussions in Committee. Does he agree that the need for some independence on staffing arrangements is underlined by other provisions in the Bill that appear to give the Secretary of State wide-ranging powers to change the agency’s object and composition, and that there is therefore a need for greater reassurance?

Nick Herbert: I certainly agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, I wonder whether we went far enough with the amendments and whether we should not have considered giving the Association of Police Authorities, or some other arrangement of police authorities, the power to appoint members to the body, rather than proceeding on the assumption that only the Secretary of State is competent to appoint members. If the body were truly to be owned by the police, that would be the logical approach. Perhaps we  will return to the issue, but I am keen to make progress and therefore I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
‘(4)The person shall, as holder of the office of constable, be under the direction and control of the chief executive of the Agency.
(5)Sub-paragraph (4) does not apply to the chief executive of the Agency.
Constables employed by the Agency: conditions of service
17A(1)In relation to the terms and conditions of the contracts of employment of employed constables, the Agency shall comply with rules or principles contained in any document issued to it for the purpose by the Secretary of State.
(2)Rules or principles under sub-paragraph (1) may (in particular)—
(a)require the adoption of specified scales or ranges of pay or allowances;
(b)require a specified class of employed constable to be treated for specified purposes in the same way as a specified class of employee (whether of the Agency or not) or office-holder;
(c)require the approval of the Secretary of State for changes in the policy or practice of the Agency;
(d)require compliance with future rules or principles, including future rules or principles specified by a person other than the Secretary of State;
(e)make different provision for different purposes.
(3)In this paragraph “employed constable” means a member of the Agency’s staff who is—
(a)a constable, and
(b)an employee of the Agency.
Regulations for constables employed by the Agency
17B(1)The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision as to the government, administration and conditions of service of employed or seconded constables.
(2)Regulations under sub-paragraph (1) may (in particular) make provision with respect to any of the following—
(a)ranks to be held by employed or seconded constables,
(b)qualifications for promotion of employed or seconded constables,
(c)voluntary retirement of a seconded constable from membership of the Agency’s staff and from membership of the body of constables from which he was seconded to the Agency,
(d)the conduct, efficiency and effectiveness of employed or seconded constables and the maintenance of discipline amongst them,
(e)suspension of employed or seconded constables from the office of constable,
(f)suspension of seconded constables from membership of the Agency’s staff,
(g)maintenance of personal records of employed or seconded constables,
(h)duties which are or are not to be performed by employed or seconded constables,
(i)powers which may be, or are not to be, exercised by employed or seconded constables,
(j)treating attendance by seconded constables—
(i)at meetings of the Police Federation for England and Wales, or
(ii)at meetings of any body recognised by the Secretary of State for the purposes of section 64 of the Police Act 1996 (c. 16) (bodies representing members of police forces who are not members of the Police Federation),
as occasions when they are performing duties as members of the staff of the Agency,
(k)the hours of duty of seconded constables, their leave and, subject to paragraph 14, their pay and allowances,
(l)the issue to seconded constables, and the use and return by seconded constables, of Agency clothing, personal equipment and accoutrements, and
(m)the disapplication, in relation to a seconded constable who is seconded to the Agency from a body of constables that is not a police force within the meaning given by section 101 of the Police Act 1996 (c. 16) (police forces for police areas in England and Wales), of provisions— 
(i)made by or under an Act, and
(ii)relating to the government, administration and conditions of service of that body of constables.
(3)Regulations under sub-paragraph (1) as to the conduct of employed or seconded constables, or as to the maintenance of discipline amongst them, may—
(a)authorise or require provision to be made, or confer discretionary powers on, the Agency, the Agency’s chief executive or other persons, or
(b)authorise or require the delegation by any person of functions conferred on that person by or under the regulations.
(4)Regulations under sub-paragraph (1) for regulating pay and allowances may be made with retrospective effect to any date specified in the regulations, but nothing in this sub-paragraph shall be read as authorising pay or allowances payable to any person to be reduced retrospectively.
(5)In this paragraph—
“employed constable” has the same meaning as in paragraph 17A;
“seconded constable” has the same meaning as in paragraph 18.’.—[Hazel Blears.]

Nick Herbert: I beg to move amendment No. 65, in schedule 1, page 48, line 4, at end insert—
‘Funding arrangements
31A15 per cent of the Agency’s funding shall be provided by police authorities’.
The amendment concerns the issue that we have just debated, namely, who owns the national policing improvement agency. The Association of Police Authorities has proposed that, in order to make it clear that police authorities really have a say in how the agency is run, they should make a contribution—it suggests 15 per cent.—to the agency’s funding. That is the figure that my amendment would insert.
I know, because the Home Office has already responded to the APA by rejecting the proposal, that Ministers feel that the Government should provide 100 per cent. of the funding, and that the APA and ACPO should have their say through their representatives on the board. However, it is always the case that he who pays the piper calls the tune. The APA makes the point that, if police authorities were to determine at least part of the agency’s funding, they would have some stake in and ownership of the agency, and that would act as a balance to the central direction of the agency.
I urge the Minister to consider the matter carefully. People do not offer the Government money every day. Normally, taxes are dragged from reluctant taxpayers and charge payers, who protest greatly about increases—and the increase has, of course, been substantial under this Government. This is an unusual suggestion on the part of police authorities, which, in part, get their resources from local taxpayers.

Martin Horwood: Can the hon. Gentleman confirm that the Conservatives, in that respect, are proposing an increase in council tax?

Nick Herbert: I perhaps should not have trespassed into electioneering. I am happy to make a pact with the hon. Gentleman not to continue in that vein.

Celia Barlow: As a local taxpayer in the hon. Gentleman’s police authority area, I declare an interest. I must also ask how much public consultation he has held about giving away 15 per cent. of the funding.

Nick Herbert: The public are going to pay for the body one way or another, through central or local taxation.

Stephen Pound: Stop digging.

Nick Herbert: I think that that is a very important point. The burden that has been shifted onto the local taxpayer through the doubling of the police precept under the current Government has been significant. It has contributed to the rises in council tax about which people—police authorities, in particular—have protested. Nevertheless, in the overall scheme of things, the agencies themselves have suggested that it would be a good idea to contribute to the costs of the agency, because that would give local people—through the police authorities—a greater stake in the running of an otherwise central organisation.
Part of the problem with the increase in the police precept has been that it has accompanied a centralisation of policing, so that people pay more but have less of a say over policing in their areas. There is nothing wrong in principle with the idea of local authorities contributing, provided that they have some stake in the outcome. I was making a slightly tongue-in-cheek point, but there is a serious underbelly to it, which goes back to the Minister’s claim that the agency would be owned by the police. If that is so, why not let the authorities make a small contribution to its funding?

Hazel Blears: I am determined that the agency will be police-owned and led, because it will not work otherwise. That is why I was at great pains, in the steering group set up to develop the agency, to ensure that chief constables and police authority representatives were at the heart of it. The APA has been very influential in developing the kind of work that the agency will do and how it will operate.
If hon. Members were to speak to authorities such as ACPO and APA, they would acknowledge the significant contribution that the authorities have made to the development of the agency. It is not a construct made from the centre, with a blueprint being imposed. If hon. Members have the opportunity to discuss the matter with senior members of ACPO and the APA, I hope that they will gain a real sense that there has been intense collaboration between the centre and the locality. That is what is unique about the agency. That is why I believe it will be extremely effective.
One reason that I reject the idea of having separate funding streams, whether through the APA or ACPO, is that I want them to influence 100 per cent. of the agency’s budget, not only a small proportion. Having different funding streams is likely to set up tensions  from the outset, with the APA feeling that it could influence only the 15 per cent. that it funded. I want it to be able to work with the police service, chiefs and officers at every level to ensure that it influences the way in which the agency operates, the strategies that it promotes, the improvements in IT that it will be working on, and the new tactics for dealing with new threats.
I see no purpose in setting up an agency that is fractured with internal tensions from the outset. If it has different sets of funding streams and different priorities, it will not have that sense of common and united purpose that will make it effective in the long run. We may take a different view on that, but I feel strongly and passionately that, if the agency is to work, there has to be trust, confidence and collaboration, and a sense that it is a joint and mutual enterprise for the good of the police service as a whole.
The agency will have the opportunity to influence the entire budget through the board, on which it will be represented. People will be able to influence it through committees and various advisory groups. A large part of its work will be about commissioning different solutions for the problems that we face—on neighbourhood policing, the sharing of information and data, how to tackle level 2 serious and organised crime, and other important and fundamental issues.  The APA and the chief constables will have a role in commissioning the kind of solutions that we want to take forward. We need to work together on that.
The NPIA is a tremendous step forward for the police service. Like any new organisation, it will doubtless have some bumpy periods as we develop it, but I have a real sense that people want to see the agency be taken forward. I am sorry, but I cannot accept the amendment.

Nick Herbert: I understand the Minister’s point. However, I think that she was labouring under a slight misunderstanding of what would constitute a 15 per cent. share of funding. It would not imply ownership of a defined 15 per cent. of the budget, or that police authorities could influence only that part of it. We assume that the money would go into a central fund and be budgeted accordingly. It would not be possible for the APA to identify a slice of 15 per cent. and claim that the remaining money belonged to the Government. Nevertheless, the funding issue is subsidiary to the overall question, which is the extent to which the NPIA will be centrally directed and controlled. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

It being twenty-five minutes past Ten o’clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at One o’clock.